Introduction
At US$45.3 billion in 1997, China was the world's second-largest recipient of foreign direct investment (FDI) after the United States (US) for the fourth consecutive year. 1 firm established in September of 1978 in China. 4 With its excellent location and strong ethnic linkage with the overseas Chinese, Dongguan is popular for foreign investors.
Despite the significance for FDI policy, only a small amount of research has been conducted in Dongguan. Most, if not all, of the literature in Dongguan consists of Chinese official internal reports, which are not accessible to the general public in China, e.g. Gao, Liu and Ye, etc. 5 In the literature published in English, with the exception of Yeung 6 , no systematic and in-depth research has been published on the relationship between FDI and the socio-economic development of Dongguan. Thoburn et al., Thoburn, Chau and Tang, Chui, Fitzgerald, and Zhang and Hung covered Dongguan in the study of FDI in southern China briefly. 7 However, none of these studies is comprehensive. With the exception of Shenzhen, there is hardly any comprehensive study on the causes of FDI conducted at a micro-geographical scale (e.g. municipal level) in China, even taking account of the Chinese official internal reports. This bizarre phenomenon is partly due to the scarcity of information and the difficulties of data accessibility, e.g. the official statistics on Dongguan were scarcely comprehensive and most of them were not disclosed until 1998. This explains why the bulk of literature is either confined to macro or meso-geographical scale studies (e.g. Lau et al., Chu, Huang, Cheung, Kueh and Ash, and Takahashi, etc.) 8 or else focus on the characteristics of certain industries or investment categories (e.g. Ho, Child and Yan, etc.). 9 Rather than focusing on the economic growth per se, this paper investigates the socio-economic causes of the inflow of FDI and its policy implications in Dongguan. Unlike the conventional definition of FDI, which is defined as "the act of acquiring assets outside one's home country" 10 of sanzi qiye and sanlai yibu. It must be emphasised that this paper does not attempt to modify the existing FDI model or propose a new FDI paradigm. 12 Dunning's eclectic paradigm of international production, which postulates that ownership-specific, locational and internalisation advantages (the OLI paradigm) are dominant factors affecting the pattern of FDI, is used to explain the favourable investment environment in Dongguan. 13 The ownership-specific advantages (O) are the prerequisite for contractual resource transfers, exportation or FDI by TNCs in the home country, i.e. the exclusive production and technical know-how, and managerial and marketing skills possessed by TNCs in the home country superior to those of its rival firms in the host country. Through exporting to or investing directly in the host country, TNCs in the home country can reduce their transaction costs and internalise the externalities in factor or product markets.
These internalisation advantages (I) are larger than the benefit from licensing production know-how to foreign firms. Moreover, the theory postulates that TNCs moved out of their country of origin because the pull factors of locational endowments (L), such as low labour costs and preferential investment incentives available from the host country, are stronger than those in the home country. In other words, TNCs select FDI because it can reap the locational advantages enjoyed by the local industry in the host country, in which direct exportation and licensing cannot be obtained.
Between 1996 and 1997, semi-structural interviews on 26 foreign-financed enterprises located in seven towns of Dongguan were conducted by the author. 14 The sample firms ranged across various manufacturing sectors: plastics and metal products, textile and clothing, toys, leather products, jewellery, electrical appliance, electronic products, and printing and paper products sectors. The overwhelming majority of the sample are investors of Hong Kong origin engaged in the P&A investment. Most of the firms investigated (15 cases) are located in Humen town. In terms of industrial sectors, textile and clothing (eight cases) and manufacturing of electrical appliances (six cases) accounts for more than half of the total firms interviewed. In terms of employment size, the medium-sized firms (51-500 workers) represent more than two-thirds of the cases. However, it is arbitrary and even misleading to use the number of workers to determine the size of firm, as a large-scale, highly automated firm might employ only 200 workers but a medium-size labour-intensive clothing firm may be employing 500 or more workers. The majority of the firms investigated belong to the class of small and medium-scale enterprises (SMEs), if capital value and size of factory premises are used to determine the size of firm.
The unprecedented development of the physical and social infrastructure has literally shaped Dongguan's landscape. The nine major favourable factors for foreign investors in Dongguan can be categorised under the Dunning's OLI framework. This paper argues that factors other than policy incentive, such as subcontractual and pseudo integration, are playing more important roles to attract the inflow of FDI and maintain the high level of economic growth in Dongguan. This finding questions the effectiveness of policy incentives, such as tax-break, implemented by the government as a mean to attract the inflow of FDI in Dongguan. Furthermore, the existence of "Chinese crony capitalism" calls for further improvement in the implementation of laws and regulations in Dongguan and the reduction of bureaucratic red-tape by the central and local governments.
The background of Dongguan is described in section 2 briefly. The investment environment in Dongguan is illustrated in terms of infrastructure, production factors (section 3) and bureaucracy (section 4). The nine major favourable factors for foreign investors in Dongguan and the applicability of the OLI paradigm are summarised in section 5, before the conclusions and implications of this paper are presented in section 6.
Background to Dongguan
Dongguan is located in the middle of the Shenzhen-Guangzhou economic corridor in the Pearl River Delta of southern China. To be more specific, Dongguan is 60 km south of Guangzhou municipality (the capital of Guangdong) and 97 km north of Shenzhen municipality (located just adjacent to Hong Kong).
At present, Dongguan is divided into 33 administrative towns/districts within its 2,465 km 2 of land. In the 1990s, about 900,000 of the overseas Chinese population (700,000 in Hong Kong and Macau, and another 200,000 in 65 different countries) originated in Dongguan. 15 Dongguan was transformed into an export-oriented manufacturing-based economy through P&A induced industrialisation and outward-oriented commercial agriculture during the first stage of economic reform up to the late1980s (the "first industrial revolution"). After being upgraded to municipal status in 1988, Dongguan invested heavily in the construction and improvement of its infrastructure, in particular transportation, power supplies and telecommunications. The "second industrial revolution" aims at transforming the sanzi qiye and its supporting service sectors into higher value-added, skillintensive and higher technology sectors is implementing since the mid-1990s.
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The privately-funded enterprises in Dongguan were selected by the government to crowd-in other complementary foreign-financed high value-added and high technology industries. 17 The Dongguan government also implemented a 
Physical Infrastructure & Factors of Production
In this section, the physical infrastructure and production factors in Dongguan are discussed.
Physical Infrastructure
Accessibility is a significant locational factor considered by foreign investors. With its particular geographical features and strategic location, roads play a more significant role than other means of transportation in Dongguan.
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Within one decade of tremendous investment by the Dongguan government, the roads in Dongguan were transformed from narrow, uneven, sandy or even muddy lanes into cement or asphalt-covered motorways connecting all villages to the 33 towns and districts of Dongguan. Subsequently, the time spent travelling from Hong Kong to Humen town was reduced from six hours in 1990 to less than two hours in 1997. In terms of accessibility, the total length of road doubled from 1,225 km in 1980 to 2,330 km in 1997 ( There is a consensus among foreign investors that transportation in Dongguan has been improving dramatically over the years. The costs of transportation is rising but it was still acceptable for the majority of interviewees.
Severe traffic congestion after traffic accidents in motorway was common in the early 1990s as it was very difficult to locate a telephone along the road to call for help. This demonstrates the significance of telecommunications and its interdependence with roads for infrastructure development. Despite the tremendous regional differentiation in electricity charges and its rising price, it is not a major factor in the locational choice for foreign investment in Dongguan as the stability and abundance of the power supply is the prime concern of foreign investors. 31 The 
Factors of Production
The labour market can be divided into two broad categories: local and Coupled with inflation and economic growth, the unofficial minimum amount of registered capital for P&A was increased to 500,000-600,000 yuan. It is indeed the practical minimum amount of investment as the electricity installation costs for a typical factory alone can be more than 100,000 yuan. As with other production factors, the actual value of the minimum amount of investment for P&A varies geographically, e.g. it was one million yuan in Qingxi town and 500,000 yuan in Changan town in 1997.
Bureaucratic Red-tape & the Abuse of Power
Despite the openness of the Dongguan government, bureaucratic red-tape and power abuse associated with the local government and the Customs still exists.
Miscellaneous Fees
To employ workers, foreign-financed firms have to apply for the following permits on their behalf:
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• Temporary residence permit (this applies to migrants only).
• Employment permit (this applies to migrants only).
• Single card or planned maternity card for married employees.
• Unemployment insurance and old age pension.
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By law, the amount of the miscellaneous charge is determined by the number of workers in the firm, e.g. it can easily over 100 yuan per worker per month. 46 In reality, the amount payable by foreign-financed firms is negotiable and various geographically. After all, it depends on guanxi as those firms with better connections can get a more favourable "discount" on the payable fee. This explains why the local people with the right connections are employed as factory managers and accountants in foreign-financed firms. This also explains why all the firms interviewed have under-report the number of workers, by 30-80%, to the local government for purposes of tax and miscellaneous fee evasion.
Despite improvements in the transparency of the system, the situation of miscellaneous charges has deteriorated in some regions. 47 In an extreme case, a foreign-financed firm in Yantian administrative region of Fenggang town had to pay 46 types of miscellaneous fees. 48 One was a "postal delivery fee" charged by the Telecommunications Bureau. In addition to paying the postal fee, the firm had to pay a "postal delivery fee" based on the number of workers, e.g. 6-8 yuan per worker per annum. This is why the firm only reports 20% of its 200 strong workforce to the government. Several entrepreneurs even suggested that they had been "cheated by the local government!" 49 Moreover, some local governments backdated the newly introduced charge several months, even before the formal approval of the municipal government had been given. 50 This is another reason why foreign-financed firms employ local people as factory managers and accountants as they have the connections and knowledge to deal with the everchanging regulations.
It is neither the miscellaneous charges per se nor the total amount of such charges that annoys the foreign investors in Dongguan. It is the ambiguity, variety and the associated high transaction costs which frustrate foreign entrepreneurs.
Connections Cultivation
It is a public knowledge that entrepreneurs used various methods of monetary and non-monetary tactics (including corruption) to cultivate connections with government officials, who hold the power in various bureaux but receive artificially low salaries. As legal representatives of Chinese partners under the (P&A) investment contracts and usually knowing government officials well, factory managers are naturally prime candidates to act as the middle-persons to assist foreign investors in cultivating a relationship with local government officials. In fact, the majority of factory managers in foreign-financed firms are local people with (very) close links to influential officials in local government.
The perception of a partisan and corrupt government is fuelled by its business role and the uneven implementation of laws. For instance, an application for a foreign investment project is more likely to be approved on time if the feasibility study is conducted by a specified consultant company, which is an affiliated company of the Dongguan government. The original rationale for setting up a consultant company is to standardise the criteria of feasibility study and speed up the approval time-lag for venture projects. Nonetheless, the dual roleboth as the governing body and a profit-making consultant company -of the Dongguan government naturally provides ammunition for conspiracy theorists to suggest that the standardisation of procedures is de facto a golden excuse to raise revenue. As the frequency of factory inspections is determined by the connections between owners and factory managers, the implementation of labour and fire safety laws is likely to encourage rent-seeking or even on-the-spot bribery to avoid hefty fines for violations of fire or labour regulations.
Even though some well-connected foreign investors are frustrated by the "black-box operation" adopted by some local governments in Dongguan: "rule-ofthe-people instead of rule-of-law". 51 Obviously, the power abuse by some officials tarnishes the reputation of Dongguan.
Customs
To facilitate the operation of foreign-financed enterprises and relieve the pressure on transportation, the "transferred goods arrangement" allows a foreignfinanced firm to sell and transport their finished goods to another foreign or locally-funded firm located in China directly.
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However, the convenience of the transferred goods arrangement for foreign-financed firms is offset by the bureaucratic regulations in import or export declaration permits. 53 The foreign-financed firms have to submit monthly records of the importation of raw materials, the exportation of finished goods and the amount of raw materials in stock. The customs declaration procedure (hexiao) is used to prevent any illegal re-selling of tariff-free raw materials or machinery imported by foreign-financed firms for profit-making purpose. Whenever there is any discrepancy between the import and export declaration forms, the Customs inspectors would regard undeclared goods as illegal sales for the local market. In addition to imposing a fine, the Customs inspectors would impose a surcharge of 40% of the value of undeclared raw materials on the foreign-financed firm. In reality, this documentation imposes extra transaction costs on foreign-financed firms and provides golden rent-seeking opportunities for Customs inspectors.
To offset the relatively low salaries (less than 1,000 yuan a month), Customs officials explore the legal loopholes and illegal means to boost their incomes. The three most common methods employed by Customs officials to generate revenue are as follows:
• Data entry fee: a Customs affiliated company charges 70 yuan to enter the information on the import or export declaration form into a computer.
• Truck inspection fee: 500 yuan or more.
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• Fines for false or incorrect declarations: the cargo is impounded and fines imposed for any intentional or unintentional discrepancies between import or export declaration documents and the cargo in terms of weight and content.
From the above, it can easily be estimated that the minimum Customs charge is 570 yuan if a truck is selected by the officials for inspection. Fines for false or incorrect declarations are legitimate since it is a way of discouraging foreign-financed firms from engaging in illegal re-selling of tariff-free raw materials to local firms. 55 No matter what the rationales behind the truck and cargo impoundment enforced by the Customs inspectors, the documentation per se is an improvement. Since the procedure is official, it at least provides a way for foreign investors to trace and negotiate the release of the detained cargo.
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There is a "delicate balance" between foreign investors and Customs officials. On the one hand, most Customs officials know the rules of the game and usually charge a "standard price" to release a cargo. 57 On the other hand, no foreign investors dare complain as most of them are either afraid of being subject to revenge from the Customs officials or fear the exposure of their own illegal activities. As there are tens of thousands of container trucks passing through the Hong Kong-Shenzhen border every day, the stakes are simply too high and peer pressure is too strong not to play the game by its rules -accept bribes. In circumstance, both foreign investors and Customs inspectors are engaged in "winwin" illegal activities: foreign investors are willing to pay to cover up their underreporting of tariff-free raw materials in import permits whilst Customs officials are content to ask for unauthorised payments.
Obviously, efforts to maintain Customs as an efficient institution is partially tarnished by the intrinsic deficiency of the reform (the artificially low salaries of civil servants) and the bad reputation associated with a group of corrupt Customs officials. This definitely mitigates against the investment environment in Dongguan. Unlike the "early birds" of the early 1980s, the majority of foreign investors are now well informed and realise the "hidden" transaction costs of doing business in China before establishing their firms. The bottom line is that the relocation of manufacturing to southern China, and in Dongguan particularly, is one feasible way for them to maintain their competitiveness.
Favourable Investment Factors in Dongguan
Before discussing the nine major favourable investment factors (ranked according to its significance) in Dongguan for foreign investors, four points have to be clarified. First, the arguments presented below explain why foreign entrepreneurs invest in Dongguan instead of elsewhere within or outside China.
Second, the favourable factors are inter-dependent. Third, the following factors are summarised from the interviewees' scripts and so do not include all the favourable investment factors that may be considered by other foreign investors.
Fourth, the following characteristics are not unique and some of them may appear in other regions which are popular with Hong Kong investors, e.g. Shenzhen and
Guangzhou. However, the competitive advantages of foreign-financed firms in Dongguan may be higher than in other regions due to the high concentration of
Hong Kong-funded firms in Dongguan and the relatively "flexible" policy on foreign investment implemented by the Dongguan government. 58 In fact, the demonstration effects of competitive advantage for foreign-financed firms in Dongguan are likely to crowd-in more foreign investment in Dongguan, ceteris paribus.
Sub-contractual & Pseudo Integration
Rather than operating independently, a number of foreign-financed SMEs in complementary and substitute (industrial) sectors located in close proximity collaborate informally to achieve economies of scale and dynamic flexibility through the following means:
• By sub-contracting one firm's order to a network of complementary and substitute firms. This practice allows a firm to accept bulk orders beyond its production capabilities and capacity.
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• By ordering in bulk and combining goods from different firms into a single shipment, the unit cost of raw material sourcing and transportation is lower due to the discounts offered.
• By sharing of raw materials, tools, machinery and spare parts in case of emergency, this allows the network members to enjoy a greater degree of flexibility. Moreover, this arrangement reduces the costs of an excessive inventory of raw materials.
• The sharing of P&A production contracts with member firms in the same sector to allow the prompt import of raw materials, resources, semi-finished goods and the export of finished goods. Since every production contract has its own pre-determined import-export quota and lasts for six months, it is common for export-oriented foreign-financed firms to over-use or under-use their quotas during the peak and non-peak seasons respectively. 60 This form of informal contractual transaction (usually an under-the-table transaction between friendly firms) is able to circumvent the bureaucracy associated with the Customs and the intrinsic constraints of P&A production contracts. 
Local Sourcing & Targeting of the Chinese Market
The agglomeration of complementary industries implies the proximity of suppliers of raw materials, packaging components or semi-finished goods. This 
Ethnic Networks & Personal Connections

Strategic Location with Low Land & Labour Costs
As with foreign investment in other LDCs, the strategic location with low land and labour costs are significant locational advantages for foreign investors in Dongguan.
The low cost of production factors was especially noticeable during the early and late 1980s, e.g. 60 yuan a month for an unskilled worker in 1986. At present, the monthly wage is about 300 yuan for an unskilled worker and about 10 yuan/m 3 per month for the rent of factory premises, which is still less than 10% of that in Hong Kong. In contrast to the workers in Hong Kong, there are plenty of migrant workers in Dongguan who are more than happy to work over-time. This explains why the attractiveness of the labour market for foreign investors does not fade even with low productivity, rising wages and higher worker turnover, which are all well publicised. After all, the total cost of employing four workers (e.g. two for sewing and another two for quality checking in a clothing manufacturing firm)
is still 80-90% less than employing one skilled sewing worker in Hong Kong, with the same level of productivity. More importantly, employers have a greater level of flexibility of production, which is one of the greatest assets of the SMEs. The prompt delivery of quality goods at bargain prices is definitely one of the most important competitive factors in the commercial world. 
Effective Channels of Communication
To facilitate the articulation and mutual understanding of policies 
Systematic Urban Planning with supporting Social Infrastructure
With the negative press reports (on crime, prostitution, etc.) in the late 1980s, most Hong Kong people were reluctant to work in southern China initially.
In addition to the monetary reward, they would like to live comfortably in China.
The availability of Hong Kong-style social and entertainment facilities, such as restaurants, night clubs, Karaoke bars and discos, make Hongkongers feel at home. The hotels located in every town centre also provide an ideal place for business meetings with potential customers. Apart from the wide, grid system motorways that are normal in other towns of Dongguan, the Changan township government invested heavily in the improvement of the environment. For example, the green belt along every major road and good public hygiene (not the lidless rubbish bins that are commonly found elsewhere) made it one of the cleanest towns in southern China. This is one of the reasons why it has been able to attract 1,300 foreign-financed enterprises, a number of which are JVs with TNCs or the subsidiaries of regional conglomerates. It is estimated that about 100,000 expatriates (mostly Hongkongers) work in foreign-financed firms in Dongguan. The interaction of the demand-pull (expatriates demand it) and supplypush (the provision of facilities) of social infrastructure in terms of a comfortable living environment and the proximity of ample entertainment facilities attracts even more expatriates to work in Dongguan.
The comfortable living environment and its associated ample social and entertainment facilities can be interpreted as an unorthodox locational factor for foreign investment in Dongguan.
Competitive Retention Rate of Foreign Exchange
The P&A fee is the value-added of the finished products, usually the difference between the import value of raw materials and the export value of the finished products. Foreign-financed firms have to pay a P&A fee in foreign currency (usually in Hong Kong dollars) through Chinese banks in Hong Kong to the local External P&A Office in China. A portion of the foreign exchange remittance is retained by the local (village) authority as foreign exchange retention (there is a discrepancy between the official and local authority exchange rates) before converting it into renminbi and depositing it in the accounts of the foreignfinanced firms.
It appears that there are no concrete guidelines on the percentage of foreign exchange retention by different township governments. 66 For example, the foreign exchange retention rate in Tangxia town was 22% in 1997. That is, 22% of the foreign exchange remitted from foreign-financed firms was levied by the Tangxia township government as foreign exchange retention, of which 19% was the village authority's charge and the other 3% Tangxia government's charge. The "real" RMB-HKD exchange rate offered by Tangxia town (0.78:1) is in fact 29%
lower than the open market exchange rate of 1.07:1. In Changan town, the foreign exchange retention rate was 25% in 1997, which is 3% higher than that in Tangxia town.
The RMB-HKD foreign exchange retention rate offered by local governments in Dongguan is usually between 0.7-0.8:1, which is generally 10-20% lower than other areas in the Pearl River Delta with the rate of 0.6-0.7:1. The lower the foreign exchange retention rate (if one HKD can exchange for more RMB), the less the transferred amount of precious foreign exchange required of the foreign investors, the stronger the locational advantage.
Flexibility & Openness of the Dongguan Government
To In general, foreign investors have full control of the production and the day-to-day management -foreign investors are treated as entrepreneurs and allowed to make profits. This is in contrast to the "iron-fist" approach adopted by "some towns in southern China, where a cargo will be held up by Customs if the firm has any overdue payments to the local government." 
Social Stability
Social stability, and especially the low crime rate, is another locational advantage of Dongguan for foreign investors. The crime rate in Dongguan was so low during the 1980s that local people went to bed without locking their doors.
With the inflow of migrants and the development of the local economy, the crime rate in Dongguan increased rapidly during the 1990s. 69 There has been some improvement during the recent years as the government is aware that the safety of foreign investors is vital for capital to continue to flow into the area.
At present, the crime rate fluctuates between bad and good in Dongguan.
In Humen town, crime has increased rapidly during recent years. There have been regular break-ins and most foreigners do not dare go to remote areas after 10 p.m.
Foreigners take extra care in the capital of Dongguan, Guancheng district, as it has the highest crime rate. Changan town now has one of the lowest crime rates in Dongguan, after the establishment of the "Safe Civilised District" (anquan wenming xiaoou). The "Safe Civilised District" is a comprehensive neighbourhood watch area with patrols of hired security guards. In Fenggang town, the Hong Kong owner of a P&A metal mould manufacturer can walk along the streets at mid-night without worrying about his safety.
Applicability of the OLI Paradigm
In general, all the favourable investment factors can be categorised according to OLI framework. This is especially the case for conventionally favourable factors for foreign investment, e.g. low labour and land costs, economies of scale, etc. This is not unexpected as most, if not all, of the push-pull factors for investment can be classified under the broadly defined OLI framework.
Nonetheless, the classification of investment factors into O, L or I is more controversial. To name a few examples, the practice of P&A production contract sharing and the subsequent reduction of transaction costs can be classified as locational rather than an internalisation advantage. This is because a firm with an over-used production quota may not be able to find another firm in the same sector with an under-used production quota in an area other than Dongguan. This is why pseudo integration is one of the competitive advantages of foreignfinanced firms in Dongguan and not in other areas of southern China. The ethnic networks and personal connections of foreign investors can be classified as an internalisation rather than locational advantage as the personal ties of foreign investors are able to dramatically reduce the information and transaction costs originating from the bureaucratic red-tape.
The OLI framework is able to explain the general picture of the FDI pattern in the country. It is also useful to formulate the research questions in a structured interview. However, it may be less useful for a semi-structured interview, except for producing a checklist of a number of relevant parameters for FDI. From the discussion in this paper, the theory is unable to explain the following factors satisfactorily:
The ethnic networks and personal connections, which itself cannot be quantified meaningfully without losing its unique role and nature in foreign investment.
Business styles or culture: flexible pragmatism allows the establishment of sub-contractual and pseudo integration, etc.
Regional differences within Dongguan in the implementation of foreign investment policies by local authorities, as illustrated by the retention rate of foreign exchange and the levy of miscellaneous fees, etc.
No matter how powerful the OLI paradigm is, it is clear that it cannot explain the dynamic interaction between foreign investment and the investment environment at a micro-geographical level satisfactorily. It is, in fact, not surprising to discover that the grand theory does not fit into a local geographical scale comfortably as it was originally formulated to analyse macro phenomena.
Furthermore, the semi-structured interviews conducted in an informal and friendly environment were able to collect much more detailed information from the interviewees than the formal and rather rigid framework implied by the theory. In fact, the flexibility of the semi-structured interview allows interviewees to point out factors that neither the theory nor the investigator realised its significance of, e.g. business culture. Therefore, the international production paradigm of FDI is less useful in the case study research approach, in particular, for semi-structured interviews.
Conclusions & Implications
Apart from the geographical endowment (such as its strategic locations), the effective implementation of foreign investment policy and the openness of local government officials to FDI are two of the reasons why Dongguan has been able to industrialise its economy rapidly.
The role of Dongguan government in economic development has been affected by the inflow of foreign capital over time. The Dongguan government learned from the development experience of the "Four Little Tigers" (especially Singapore and Hong Kong) and Shenzhen. They realised that the role and significance of overseas Chinese capital for the industrialisation of Dongguan.
When the economy started to develop and the local government gained a higher level of autonomy in administration and financial matter since 1988, the Dongguan government invested billions of yuan to develop the physical infrastructure, especially motorway networks, electricity supplies and telecommunications facilities. 70 To facilitate the growing demand for semi-skilled and skilled labour, the government also invested heavily in the enrichment of human capital endowment (entrepreneurial state). With tremendous investment in education, the proportion of lower secondary school graduates continuing to higher secondary school education increased more than three-fold, to 87% in 1997. 71 To further improve the investment environment, the Dongguan On the other hand, the so-called "Chinese cronyism" unavoidably leads to favouritism, nepotism and even corruption. 75 The special relationships between the government, government-funded firms and overseas Chinese-funded enterprises are hot-beds for generating rent-seeking activities. It also implies the implementation of policies which are biased against outsiders without the appropriate connections. This explains why the "strike hard" anti-corruption policy enforced by the central government has only had moderate success in southern China. As the "mountain is high and the king is far away" in Beijing, neither partners in the closely intertwined politician-entrepreneur partnership are willing to rock the boat and jeopardise their own safety. In Dongguan, it is obviously that the power of guanxi network is greater than the law in some circumstances. The existing guanxi network game tilts the balance toward local government-funded enterprises and overseas Chinese-funded enterprises with the right connections. The Dongguan government is both regulator and player simultaneously. By laying down and implementing the laws governing foreign-financed firms, the government is the regulator (referee) of the game. However, the government acts as a player by participating in the game for profit-making purposes in the form of government-funded enterprises and JVs with foreign investors. 78 From this perspective, the laws and regulations governing "Chinese crony capitalism" in Dongguan are less frequently implemented than the laws and regulations of "Western crony capitalism" in North America and Europe.
Obviously, there is room for further improvement in the implementation of laws and regulations in Dongguan. 79 To promote "long-term cost-saving" measures for th of January 1994.), p. 220. 19 As the consumer price index is only available from 1984 onward, therefore, the retail price index-based GDP deflator is used to estimate the real GDP in Dongguan. 20 In 1997, Dongguan's 1.47 million local population and 2,465 km 2 of land accounted for 2.1% of the total population and 1.39% of total land area in Guangdong province and 0.12% of total population and 0.02% of total land area in China as a whole. Dongguan accounted for an average 3.7% of real GDP in Guangdong and an average 0.24% of real GDP in China. The real GDP per capita in Dongguan was on average 1.75 times higher than that of Guangdong and on average 2.1 times higher than that of China. 21 The overwhelming majority of the migrant population are part of the labour force: 100% of migrants were part of the labour force in 1986 and the rate remained very high, at 90%, in 1997. During the 1990s, the number of migrant workers was larger than the local population workforce. In 1997, the 1.31 million migrant workers was about 150% higher than the 876,000 local workforce. Obviously, the inflow of migrants was able to keep labour costs down and this contributed to the high growth rate of Dongguan. 25 The decentralisation of government-owned trading firms and the subsequent improvement in efficiency may have contributed to the growth in export value. Before the manager responsibility system was enforced in 1987, the Dongguan branches of government-owned trading firms were allowed to regulate their own export quotas. As the economy developed, the share of export value channelled through the Dongguan's Commission of Foreign Economic Relation and Trade in the total export value in Dongguan (the Customs' figures) diminished from 80% in 1990 to 44% in 1997 (Dongguan Bureau of Statistics, Dongguan tongji nianjian 1998. p. 345). As the Customs figures are only available from 1990 onward, this is why they are not used. 26 Ibid. 27 Roads are used more frequently than the railways or waterways to transport cargo. The Customs procedures allow container trucks to pass though one of the three Customs checkpoints in Lok Ma Chau, Sha Tau Kok or Man Kam To. Although the border gates are not opened 24 hours a day, cargo trucks are able to provide a door-to-door delivery service, which is more efficient than the water and rail routes as no transhipment is required. Commuters in Dongguan travelling abroad can use the Baiyun international airport in Guangzhou or the Huangtian airport in Shenzhen. It take about 30-45 minutes by car from Huangtian airport in Shenzhen to Humen town and from Baiyun airport in Guangzhou to Shilong town. In railway, the development is rather piece-meal. Between 1987 and 1990, the Dongguan government improved the passenger and cargo terminals in seven out of the eight towns on the Guangzhou-Kowloon double-track railway route -Shilong, Chashan, Hengli, Changping, Tangxia, Zhangmutou and Genggang. A new rail station in Changping -the intersection points of the 174 km Guangzhou-Shenzhen high speed route, Guangzhou-Meizhou-Shantou route and Beijing-Kowloon route -was opened (Dongguan Municipal Government, Zhengfu gongzuo baogao [1988] [1989] [1990] [1991] [1992] [1993] [1994] 31 The rising cost of electricity can be interpreted as an inflation-indexed price adjustment in some towns. For instance, the inflation-tied average annual 13% price rise in Shilong town resulted in the price tripling from 0.4 yuan/KWH in 1988 to 1.2 yuan/KWH in 1997. The rapid industrialisation in Dongguan led to an increase in the total consumption of electricity of 58 times, from 149 million KWH in 1978 to 8.66 billion KWH in 1997. To match the increase in demand, the total electricity supply also increased 58 times from 163 million KWH in 1978 to 9.49 billion KWH in 1997. In spite of the enormous increased in supply, electricity consumption is about 90% of the total electricity supply (industrial consumption of electricity accounted for 65-75%) (Dongguan Bureau of Statistics, Dongguan tongji nianjian 1998, p. 146.) As there is little excess capacity, an unexpected surge of electricity demand will lead to blackout. This is why a number of foreign-financed firms installed in-house electricity generators as a backup power system. 32 Due to the differences of surcharge levied by local authorities, the rural residents in Guangdong pay 1.3 yuan/KWH on average, compared with the 0.96 yuan/KWH in the province as a whole. However, Guangdong province aims to eliminate this price difference by upgrade the rural electric power network and overhaul of its system of power administration. The provincial government will invest nine billion yuan over the next three years for laying and improving 144,100 km of low-voltage transmission lines, 48,200 km of high-voltage wire and the installation of 56,000 transformers. According to the new governor, Mr Lu Ruihua, Guangdong will establish a unified electricity charge at 0. 79 A legal cellular-phone costs about 4,000 yuan or more and the monthly subscription fee is another 150-200 yuan. This is equivalent to two month's salary for a factory manager in a foreign-financed firm or ten months wages for a migrant worker. 34 Since the Labour Laws stipulates that the minimum age to work is 16 years old, some underaged workers apply for jobs with false identity cards. 35 Dongguan Bureau of Statistics, Dongguan tongji nianjian 1998, pp. 181-184. 36 The majority of interviewees regard female workers to be more suitable in labour-intensive industries while male workers are trouble-makers, getting involved in strikes, fights and other undesirable behaviour. This is especially the case of male migrants of Sichuan and Hunan origins. 37 Field survey in 1996-97. The worker turnover rate has been rising rapidly since 1992, partly due to better information available to migrant workers. Ironically, this is the result of a more developed labour market. 38 Estimated from the quarterly value, the RMB to USD exchange rate was 1.5143:1 in 1980, 3.0691:1 in 1985, 5.0026:1 in 1990 and 8.2881:1 in 1997. 39 Field survey in 1996-97. 40 The apparent obedience of migrant workers is a result of "informal collaboration" between the local government and foreign investors. Foreign investors are able to contain and dismiss disruptive workers (even illegally) with the blessing of the local government since large-scale labour unrest or strikes would damage the reputation of the "docile labour market" of Dongguan. 41 For example, in Tangxia town, the rent increased five-fold from 25 yuan/m 3 in 1993 to 100 yuan/m 3 in 1997. 42 The original form of P&A is SOEs or collective enterprises which use their surplus production and labour capacities to process or assemble products for foreign investors. The daily managerial and financial power of the firms are still in Chinese firms' hands. Zhen-bang Liu & Xi-wen Zhen, Dongguan touzi shiwu, pp. 10-11. 43 The change in the appearance of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) secretary in Fenggang town reflects the new wealth of the township governments in Dongguan. The township government party secretary rode his bicycle and wore a pair of shorts to meet potential foreign investors 15 years ago. The foreign investors were treated to a VIP reception if they intended to invest three million yuan in the region and the corresponding memorandum of understanding was signed in the best hotel in Shenzhen. The party secretary later drove a motorcycle and then a Toyota Crown five years ago. Today, he sits in a chauffeur-driven Mercedes-Benz limousine. 44 As most migrants do not have enough cash to process the application, the firm employing them has to report to and pay the appropriate authorities before deducting the application fees from their wages in instalments. Foreign-financed firms in Dongguan must possess the following licences or certificates: (1) business registration permit, (2) national tax certificate, (3) provincial (Guangdong) tax certificate, (4) certificate of Quality Licence for Export Commodities, (5) certificate of Quarantine Licence for Export Commodities, (6) hygiene certificate, (7) labour insurance certificate and (8) health insurance certificate. 45 The Regulations on the Unemployment Insurance in Dongguan was implemented from 1 January 1997 onward. The monthly insurance premium is 1% of the average monthly remuneration of all employees in the firm during the last financial year. Dongguan Bureau of Statistics, Dongguan tongji nianjian 1998, p. 93-97. 46 The local government imposes a fine of 200-1,000 yuan on those firms employing workers without all the required permits. In some cases, workers do not possess employment permits because their previous employers had not completed the appropriate application procedures before they resigned. They are usually employed as temporary workers and their employers do not sign formal employment contracts with them. In fact, some migrants prefer to work on a temporary basis as it allows them to job-hop. 47 Any departments could charge "any amount of money" without legal grounds during the late 1980s. This is partly the result of the self-financing reforms as most government bureaux explored every means to raise revenue, both legitimate and illegitimate. In response to constant complaints by foreign investors, the Dongguan government conducted a survey of foreign-financed firms on the legitimacy of the miscellaneous charges after Mr Li Jin-wei was elected as the Dongguan CCP secretary. At present, all miscellaneous charges levied to foreign-financed and locally-funded enterprises must be approved by the Dongguan government (Dongguan Bureau of Statistics, Dongguan tongji nianjian 1998, p. 83.). In an effort to stamp out illegal charges, the corresponding authorities issue receipts for every item of miscellaneous charge. 48 Each of the 38 McDonald's restaurants in Beijing has to pay 31 fees, most of which are unauthorised. According to the investigation conducted by the Beijing mayor's special tribunal, only two of the 31 fees are totally justified -such as the US$600-1,200 per year trash collection fee -, while eight are questionable and 17 are illegitimate. For example, the US$360-600 charge a year for "spiritual civilisation", a campaign led by President Jiang Zemin that has covered Beijing in banners telling people to be more civilised (International Herald Tribune, "China's Tax Collectors on a Roll at McDonald's." 11 th September 1997, p. 17.). In 1998, the central government disciplined 1,273 local officials for levied illegitimate miscellaneous fees on enterprises. To improve the investment environment, the central government abolished 973 items of miscellaneous fees with a total value of 45 billion yuan per annum, while the local governments removed another staggering 26,710 items of miscellaneous fees with a total value of 98.5 billion yuan in 1998. In six provinces (Guangdong, Jiangsu, Hebei, Henan, Hunan and Sichuan), the items of arbitrary levies decreased by 30% (Hong Kong Standard, "Blitz on Random Fee Scams." 23 rd February 1999). 49 Field survey in 1996-97. 50 The central government also exercise backdated charges. In July 1998, the State Administration of Taxation announced that an 8% of value-added tax (VAT) on the export value of import processing P&A firms (laiyang jiagong, where P&A firms importing raw materials and exporting finished products on their own accounts) would be implemented from 1 st January 1999. As the new VAT law is backdated for two years, the Guangdong Provincial Foreign Economic and Trade Commission estimates that the new VAT law will wipe off the combined 1997 profits of the import processing P&A firms. Due to the slowing down of FDI and lobbying effort of Guangdong government, the State Council decided to grand a two-year tax relief on the new VAT law for the import processing P&A firms established before 1994. However, the tax relief is not applicable to the import processing P&A firms established after 1994 as their export VAT are calculated according to the same criteria as the locally-funded exporters. To circumvent the VAT, the P&A firms can changed from import processing to contract processing (lailiao jiagong, where P&A firms manufacturing finished goods for clients who import their own raw materials 51 A number of foreign investors air their grievances about the extent of involuntary donations and extortion. In 1995, the Public Security Bureau officials went to every foreign-financed firm in a town of Dongguan with 1,000 yuan receipts for donations for the completion of the Public Security Bureau headquarters. In 1996, five People's Armed Police officers armed with AK-47 rifles surrounded the factory premises and demanded to undertake an inspection at mid-night. The Hong Kong manager had to pay 30,000 yuan for them to resolve the "crisis". 52 Since the cargo is delivered to customers in China directly instead of being exported to Hong Kong and imported into China again, the transferred goods arrangement lowers the transportation costs of foreign-financed enterprises. A foreign-financed firm is entitled to transferred good arrangement only if the following conditions are fulfilled: (1) a prior approval from the Customs; (2) all the final products of the transferred goods are for exports; (3) both companies have import licenses for the transferred goods; and (4) the quantity of the transferred goods is less than the quantity of imported by the firm. 53 The transferred good management also hindered by the cargo declaration procedures. In general, there are two types of cargo declaration: "Centralised Customs Declarations" (jizhong baoguan) and "Sealed Customs Declarations" (fengguan). "Centralised Customs Declarations" are simpler in procedure and the cargo (usually destined to or originating from Shenzhen) can pass through any computerised checkpoints in the three Sino-Hong Kong border posts. The cargo for "Sealed Customs Declarations" procedure is usually destined to areas outside Shenzhen. The cargo is sealed after passing through the local Customs in Dongguan before passing through one of the Sino-Hong Kong Customs, therefore, the documents have to be inspected again. Moreover, the second-line Customs at Shenzhen SEZ has the authority to inspect the cargo even it has been inspected at the Sino-Hong Kong border or Dongguan Customs checkpoint. 54 Rumours circulating among factory managers claim that the inspection company shares its profits with the Customs at a ratio of 40:60 (though it is not clear which gets the 60%) in exchange for the exclusive right to operate on the border. 55 Recent Customs rules classify P&A firms into four categories according to their past compliance with the re-export laws and the value of re-export. The P&A firms classified as lower categories (categories C and D) are required to pay deposits on imported materials. Those P&A companies dump products earmarked for export on to the domestic market will have their deposits confiscated (South China Morning Post, "Honest Re-exporters to benefit from Crackdown on Dodgers." by Matthew Millers, Business Post, 30 th August 1999.) 56 As with the miscellaneous fees discussed above, the standardisation process itself has improved the Customs documentation but has little impact on the prevention of the abuse of power. In 1996, a soft-toys manufacturing firm in Laiobu town firm paid 20,000 yuan to Customs officials in Shenzhen after a container of Christmas toys exported to the US was detained for three days because the toys had no stuffing inside, and therefore did not exactly match the P&A production contract of stuffed-toy. In June and July of 1997, the same firm was forced to pay 25,000 and 20,000 yuan for two separate shipments as Customs inspectors found the eyes of the soft-toys were made of material other than plastic, again different from the product description defined in the production contract. The firm had to pay because "it is better to not make any profit or even lose some money on one deal rather than lose the customer by being unable to deliver the cargo on time." (field survey in 1996-97) Moreover, a number of entrepreneurs and factory managers revealed that Customs officials tend to target valuable cargo to inspect, especially electronic
